Safety and control strategy

Safety and security is one of the most important pillars of any transport infrastructure. This is particularly the case for transport interchanges, which are used on a daily basis by hundreds of thousands of passengers.

Measures include safety procedures, training programmes for staff, safety plans (control of fire hazards, maintenance office protection systems, building evacuation procedures), security risk assessment, regular safety tests, control systems (CCTV, staffing, emergency alarms, fire protection, etc.), identification of potential risks for the transport infrastructure.

The following distinction should be made. – Security = “incident” / notion of malevolence / e.g. act of terrorism – Safety = “accident”/ no malevolence / e.g. fire


NODES strategic objectiveContribution
Enhance accessibility and integration 0
Enhance intermodality 0
Enhance liveability +
Increase safety and security conditions ++
Increase economic viability and costs efficiency 0
Stimulate local economy 0
Increase environmental efficiency 0
Increase energy efficiency 0

Good practice

CRTM Transport Interchange Plan

La Défense safety plan (Paris)

Application in NODES test sites – Tisséo, Toulouse

The tool applies to the entire Tisséo transport network whose interchanges include those of Marengo-SNCF, Arènes and Aéroport Toulouse Blagnac that are 3 of the 5 major interchanges of the Tisséo network and 2 of which reach out nationally (Marengo-SNCF railway station) and internationally (Aéroport Toulouse Blagnac).

Tisséo security management mainly intervenes at the busiest stations in the network and hence at certain interchanges, particularly “Arènes” and “Marengo-SNCF” (NODES demonstration sites in Toulouse). The “Toulouse Blagnac Airport” interchange is less well covered by Tisséo security/safety insofar as airport security/safety is already highly mobilised and there are no particular problems. (It should be noted that a single airport management authority handles security and safety). Safety management intervenes according to the provisions relative to ERPs (Etablissements Recevant du Public, public spaces) in safety matters (“stations accessible to the public”). Http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/Etablissements-recevant-du-public,13420.html (FR)

As far as Tisséo is concerned, the present tool covers both security (Security Management) and safety (Safety Management).

Tisséo Security Management (operator): preventing degradation of the network and guaranteeing a feeling of safety among users. Only the prevention of delinquency (monitoring, maintenance). Not an obligation, but an aim. Objective of reinforcing the enhanced urban integration of interchanges. Objective of Tisséo Safety Management (operator): ensuring effective safety and the feeling of safety at the station/interchange.

Within the legal framework for security management in France, the operator holds no obligation within the scope of Establishments Receiving the Public (ERP) (except for Tisséo Jean-Jaurès interchange, which is classified as Category 1 and therefore has an obligation to have a fire safety station with Security Services for Emergencies and Personal Assistance agents) on-site. ERPs are regulated in the field of safety, but not of security. Tisséo (operator) employs safety agents supervised by the National Council of Private Safety Activities (CNAPS).

Legal framework for safety management

In France, ERPs regulate safety and not security. Historically, Tisséo security management was attached to the Human Resources Department of the network operator (operator). Management is now attached to a security/safety department, still with the operator.  It comprises:

45 agents for delinquency prevention (role to provide warning, observation, issuing sanctions)

45 ticket collectors, 3 night bus accompaniers / mediators? (subcontracted in addition to prevention agents) (role?)

9 Tisséo supervisors

28 administrative staff

= 130 people  + mediators subcontracted. Planning team (planning presence) on the basis of reporting incidents or prior warning signs of a worsening atmosphere (space/time/qualification database).  Underway: procedures remaining to be formalised. Currently no master plan, more an operating procedure, more provisions for intervention than formalised procedures for prevention.

Determination to further control and formalise with general recommendations, procedures, operating procedures and recordings, as well as setting up referral agents by station/interchange. Underway: further training of security/safety agents. Tisséo does not have a “station master” like the French SNCF rail operator. As a result, any person observing a problem uses a commercial report sheet or a “security warning sheet” to issue a warning. For this reason, estimating the cost of material damage is impossible.


Potential interchange performance improvement

The main objectives to be achieved through this tool are the following:

–          To optimise safety in the transport interchange and to monitor the circumstances that may be susceptible to causing damage of any kind;

–          To identify, evaluate and monitor the risk factors inside the infrastructure;

–          To plan the response to incidents and emergencies.

–          To cooperate with external resources

Moreover, good co-ordination between the (many) players on the same site to pool security/safety resources is necessary. Social insertion / co-ordination with stakeholders (especially social-educational players) is a key to correct implementation and effectiveness of security provisions. Users tend to have greater expectations in terms of security-safety.


Resources

A team of experts is required during the process. All costs are usually borne by the transport authority, planners or consultants in the phase of the study and by the concession-holder in charge of maintenance.

The tool is demanding in terms of human resources (staff at interchange). It is more or less necessary, depending on the scale of the network. It is applicable and recommended to major networks (the national and municipal police often take over in smaller scale networks; conversely, existence of the rail police).

References

CEPREVEN. http://www.cepreven.com/

Etablissement recevant du public (ERP)                                                                                                                                                                               http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/Etablissements-recevant-du-public,13420.html (FR)

National Fire Prevention Association (USA) http://www.nfpa.org/

Software: CFDAnsys CFX, LEGION